Homeland Security: Navy Operations - Background and Issues for Congress by O'Rourke, Ronald
1 Quotes from Navy officials included in this section are taken from Navy briefings and briefing
papers on Navy HLD and HLS operations provided to CRS in January 2005.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Order Code RS21230
Updated June 2, 2005
Homeland Security: Navy Operations — 
Background and Issues for Congress
Ronald O’Rourke
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
The Department of Defense (DOD), which includes the Navy, has been designated
the lead federal agency for homeland defense (HLD), while the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), which includes the Coast Guard, has been designated the
lead federal agency for homeland security (HLS).  Several Navy activities contribute to
HLS and HLD.  The Navy’s HLS and HLD operations raise several potential oversight
issues for Congress, including Navy coordination with the Coast Guard in HLS and
HLD operations.  This report will be updated as events warrant.
Background
Key Terms And Definitions.1  In discussing the Navy’s homeland security
operations, key terms include homeland security (HLS), homeland defense (HLD), civil
support (CS), maritime domain awareness (MDA), the global war on terrorism (GWOT),
and anti-terrorism/force protection (AT/FP).  These terms are discussed briefly below.
The maritime elements of HLS and HLD are abbreviated MHLS and MHLD, respectively.
Navy officials, following the National Strategy for Homeland Security, define
homeland security as “a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the
United States, to reduce vulnerability to terrorism, and to minimize the damage and
recover from attacks that do occur.”  Following the Defense Planning Guidance for
FY2004-FY2009, Navy officials define homeland defense as “the protection of U.S.
territory, sovereignty, domestic population, and critical infrastructure against external
threats and aggression,” and civil support as “Department of Defense (DOD) support to
U.S. civil authorities for domestic emergencies and for designated law enforcement and
other activities.”  Under these definitions, there is some overlap between HLS and HLD,
particularly with regard to protecting against terrorist attacks within the United States, and
some overlap between HLS and CS, particularly with regard to responding to effects of
terrorist attacks within the United States.
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Navy officials define maritime domain awareness as “the effective understanding
of anything associated with the maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, or
economy of the United States.”  MDA, Navy officials state, “globally links coordinating
commands, helps to define the initial battlespace, and is a national-level mission requiring
cooperative efforts by many different departments, agencies, and civilian organizations.”
Examples of potential maritime threats to be detected by MDA, Navy officials state,
include terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, piracy, arms trafficking,
narcotics smuggling, other criminal activities, and mass migrations.  The Coast Guard has
identified the achievement of MDA as a key goal, and has identified specific programs in
its budget as supporting MDA.2
Navy officials state that MHLD is part of the larger global war on terrorism.  Anti-
terrorism/force-protection refers to measures taken to protect U.S. military forces and
facilities (e.g., Navy personnel, ships, and bases) against attack, including terrorist attacks.
Some Navy AT/FP efforts can qualify as MHLS or MHLD activities.
Navy MHLS and MHLD Activities.  Table 1 on the next page shows how
selected Navy activities can contribute to, or qualify as, MHLS, MHLD, GWOT, or
AT/FP efforts.  (Some of the activities listed separately in the table can be viewed as
alternate ways of describing essentially the same kinds of operations.)  As can be seen in
the table, in light of the overlapping definitions discussed above, a number of Navy
activities can qualify under more than one of these terms, depending on the exact scenario
in question.
Navy and Coast Guard Roles in MHLS and MHLD.  The Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), which includes the Coast Guard, has been designated the lead
federal agency for HLS,3 while DOD, which includes the Navy, has been designated the
lead federal agency for HLD.4  Given the partial overlap in definitions between MHLS and
MHLD, situations involving potential terrorist attacks in the maritime domain close to the
United States could pose a question as to whether DHS or DOD should take the lead in
responding.  Navy officials state that in such situations, until a Presidential decision is
made to assign a lead agency, or in time-critical situations, on-scene Coast Guard and
Navy commanders are empowered to act in accordance with established authorities,
procedures, guidance, and policies.  If time permits, the President, in consultation with
appropriate cabinet officials, will decide whether the situation is an HLS or HLD event,
thus determining whether DHS or DOD is the lead agency.
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Table 1.  Selected Navy HLS, HLD, GWOT and AT/FP Activities
This potential or actual U.S. Navy activity... ... can contribute to, or qualify as
HLS HLD GWOT AT/FP
Participate in building and maintaining maritime
domain awareness
X X X
Intercept terrorists or weapons of mass destruction,
or potentially threatening ships or aircraft that are in
or approaching U.S. territorial waters
X X X
Protect U.S. Navy bases and facilities in United
States, and U.S. Navy ships at ports or shipyards in
the United States or U.S. territorial waters
X X X
Protect U.S. homeland from attack by ballistic
missiles, cruise missiles, conventional attack, and
asymmetric/terrorist attack
X X
Protect U.S. Navy computer networks X X
Assist U.S. civil authorities in responding to or
recovering from a terrorist attack
X X
Assist Coast Guard in protecting U.S. ports and
coastal areas
X
Participate in Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)5
or Theater Security Initiative
X X
Maintain forward-deployed naval presence overseas X X
Protect U.S. Navy bases and facilities in foreign
countries, and forward-deployed U.S. Navy ships,
from terrorist or asymmetric attack
X X
Measures to protect individual Navy sailors X
Source: Information sheet provided to CRS by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs, Feb. 1, 2005.  The Navy
states that the columns marked for these activities are highly scenario-dependent.
HLS Events.  Existing concepts of operations for the commanders of the Navy’s
Atlantic and Pacific fleets describe Navy support and resources potentially available for
use by the Coast Guard, as the lead federal agency, for MHLS events.  Navy forces are
requested and provided to the Coast Guard through a request for assistance (RFA) that
requires the approval of the Secretary of Defense.  The existing concepts of operations
documents define action areas and a scalable response that DOD could provide support
to the Coast Guard’s three Maritime Security (MARSEC) levels.  A draft Secretary of
Defense memorandum provides both the authority and procedure for DOD to respond to
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time-critical situations by rapidly transferring DOD assets to the Coast Guard to respond
to HLS missions.  It also provides guidance for the Navy’s 2nd and 3rd Fleets (which
operate in the Atlantic and the Eastern Pacific, respectively) for conducting MHLD
missions.  As of January 2005, a draft reciprocal memorandum of agreement (MOA) was
being prepared in parallel to the draft Secretary of Defense memorandum to provide a
more formal standing agreement for rapidly transferring DOD assets in time-critical
situations.  The Secretary of Defense memorandum and the reciprocal MOA are intended
to expedite the RFA process.
HLD Events.  A memorandum of agreement (MOA) between DOD and DHS
regarding the inclusion of the Coast Guard in support of MHLD established a DOD joint
command and control structure for MHLD that includes Coast Guard forces.  It also
identifies and documents roles, missions, and functions for the Coast Guard in support of
MHLD operations.
Navy Command Structure for HLD.  The Commander of U.S. Fleet Forces
Command (CFFC), located in Norfolk, VA, who is also the Commander of the U.S.
Atlantic Fleet, is assigned as the supporting naval component command and the Joint
Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) to the Commander of the U.S.
Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) for planning and conducting MHLD operations
in the USNORTHCOM area of responsibility.6
Navy Authorities and Concept of Operations for HLD.  A series of Execute
Orders (EXORDs) issued under Operation Noble Eagle (the overarching name for HLD
operations) provides DOD, including the Navy, with authorities, responsibilities, rules of
engagement, and guidance for HLD operations.  The EXORDs provide an overarching
HLD concept of operations for DOD that implements a five-tiered, graduated-response
posture enabling a scalable response to maritime and aerospace threats to the U.S.
homeland.  The documents identify the Navy’s primary contribution to HLS, HLD, and
GWOT as deterring the threat forward (i.e., overseas) with combat-capable forward-
deployed forces.  CFFC is a central participant in developing a concept of operations for
MHLD and support to MHLS in USNORTHCOM’s area of responsibility.  As of January
2005, this concept of operations was in final development.
Navy Assets For MHLD and MHLS Operations.  U.S.-based Navy ships and
aircraft that are between their regularly scheduled overseas deployments, as well as Navy
coastal warfare units and explosive ordnance disposal units, are available as needed for
MHLS and MHLD operations.  On any given day, some Navy ships and aircraft might be
engaged in such operations.  In the event of an MHLS or MHLD event, additional U.S.-
based ships and aircraft could be surged into operation.
Navy Support to Coast Guard MHLS Operations.  Current Navy assistance
to the Coast Guard for MHLS operations includes, among other things, the transfer to the
Coast Guard of five of the Navy’s 13 Cyclone (PC-1) class fast patrol boats.  Four of these
170-foot craft were transferred on September 30, 2004; the fifth is to be transferred on
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September 30, 2005.  The Navy is to pay the maintenance costs of these craft during
FY2006-FY2008.
Navy Funding for MHLS and MHLD Operations.  Table 2 below shows, for
the FY2006-FY2011 Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP), projected direct Navy funding
for HLD and for Navy AT/FP efforts that may indirectly support HLD.
Table 2.  Navy Funding For HLD and AT/FP Supporting HLD
(millions of dollars, rounded to the nearest million)
FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FYDP
Recurring, direct Navy funding to support HLD
   Coast Guard support 63 63 64 53 54 56 353
   Maritime intelligence 9 9 9 9 10 10 56
   FEMA/EM 1 1 1 1 1 1 6
SUBTOTAL 73 73 74 63 65 67 415
Navy funding for AT/FP efforts that may indirectly support HLD
   Ashore efforts 1,159 1,248 1,217 1,318 1,275 1,278 7,495
   Afloat efforts 1,013 861 1,206 1,153 1,216 1,271 6,720
   NCIS/AT 84 86 84 87 92 95 528
SUBTOTAL 2,256 2,195 2,507 2,558 2,583 2,644 14,743
Source: Information sheet provided to CRS by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs, January 25, 2005.
In the table above, the line for Coast Guard support includes maintenance support in
FY2006-FY2008 for PC-1 class patrol boats operated by the Coast Guard (a total of $30
million) and support in FY2006-FY2011 for common Navy-Coast Guard weapons and
C4I (command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence) systems.  Maritime
intelligence is support for joint Navy-Coast Guard maritime intelligence and interdiction
efforts.  FEMA/EM is direct support for the Federal Emergency Management Agency and
related assistance to civil authorities for emergency management.
Ashore and afloat, AT/FP efforts include training and deployment of AT/FP
personnel; Navy contributions to programs relating to weapons of mass destruction;
enhanced shipboard, port, and facilities defenses; and physical security equipment,
weapons, and ammunition.  NCIS/AT is funding for Naval Criminal Investigative Service
anti-terrorism support to fleet deployments, threat databases and warning systems,
protective operations, and vulnerability assessments.
Table 2 does not reflect funding for Navy ships, aircraft, and personnel that are
tasked on an ad hoc basis for HLD missions.  When ships and aircraft are assigned for
specific HLD missions, their operational costs are reimbursed subject to case-by-case
adjudication by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
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Potential Oversight Issues for Congress
The Navy’s HLD and HLS operations raises several potential oversight issues for
Congress, including the following.
Coordination With and Support For Coast Guard.  Are policies, concepts of
operations, procedures, and tactics for coordinating Navy and Coast Guard HLS and HLD
operations complete and sufficient?  If not, what additional work needs to be done?  Are
the two services conducting sufficient exercises and training in joint HLS and HLD
operations?  Are Navy and Coast Guard systems sufficiently interoperable to reach desired
levels of coordination?  Is the Navy providing the right numbers and kinds of ships to
assist the Coast Guard in performing HLS operations?
Navy LCS and Coast Guard Deepwater Programs.  Navy and DHS officials
have recently suggested that the Navy’s new Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) could be
appropriate for HLD operations.7  The Coast Guard is procuring new cutters under its
Deepwater acquisition program that could also suitable for HLD operations.8  Have the
Navy and Coast Guard adequately coordinated their requirements for LCSs and Deepwater
cutters for HLD operations?
Impact on Navy Force-Structure Requirements.  Will Navy HLS and HLD
operations add to requirements for the total size of the Navy, and if so, by how much?9
Maritime Analog To NORAD.  Navy and DOD officials since 2003 have spoken
about creating a maritime analog to the North American Air Defense Command
(NORAD).10  What would such an entity encompass, and is this idea compatible with
Coast Guard’s concept for MDA?
Security at U.S. Navy Installations.  Has the Navy taken adequate steps to
improve security at naval installations in the United States?  Is the Navy conducting
sufficient testing of these measures?  Have lessons learned from the October 2000 attack
on the USS Cole been adequately incorporated?  What new technologies or systems are
under development that may improve future Navy capabilities in this area?
Cyberwar Attacks on Naval Computers.  Potential questions here are
analogous to those listed above for security at U.S. Navy installations.
